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  Central banks are peculiar institutions with one foot in the private sector and one 
foot in the government.
1  In the United States, in particular, the central bank stands out as 
the extra-constitutional fourth branch of the federal government.  It has considerable 
power which it can exercise without any significant formal review or interference from 
Congress, the President or any elected officials.  It stands outside the American 
constitutional framework with its checks and balances on the exercise of power by 
Congress, the President and the judiciary.   The Fed’s unique position has withstood 
repeated challenges to its legality and extra constitutional status and, like central banks 
around the world, it is viewed as an essential part of the policy framework. 
 
  Indeed, modern thinking about central banking gives enormous emphasis to the 
notion of central banking independence.  Only a central bank that is independent of the 
political sphere will be able to maintain a consistent anti-inflationary policy stance.  So, 
central bankers should not be subject to regular political review or oversight and should 
hold office for a long period of time.  Some central banks were set up with this 
independent quasi-governmental status such as the Federal Reserve System.
2 Some 
evolved in that direction such as the Bank of England which was a private institution 
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1 Perhaps it is only of symbolic importance but only the Board of Governors of 
the Federal Reserve has a ‘.gov’ web address while the regional Federal Reserve banks 
are private banking corporations with ‘.org’ addresses.  
 
2 Nevertheless, the Fed did not always maintain an independent approach to 
policy.  Notably, starting in World War II the Treasury essentially set interest rate policy, 
an arrangement which only ended with the Treasury Accord in 1951.  
  1until it was nationalized by the post war Labor government and then was not granted its 
policy independence until 1997.
3 
 
  There are complex reasons why countries have developed these institutions called 
central banks.  Many of them have to do with the historical evolution of both institutions 
and thinking about the roles of the central banks.  In the first part of this essay we will 
trace the evolution of thinking about the role of a central bank.   In the second part, we 
will provide a framework for thinking about the role of central banks in the post crisis 
world.  
 
  Towards the end of the 20
th century, it seemed to many observers that a consensus 
view had emerged regarding the proper functions of a central bank.  However, as is often 
the case, just when this happens something comes along to upset the consensus.  And, the 
recent financial crisis has thrown the issue wide open once again.  We will find that the 
understanding of the role of central banks has always been in flux.
4  Most importantly, 
there are at present large elements of uncertainty regarding the proper role of central 
banks. 
 
The Evolution of modern central banking 
 
  The beginnings.  Institutions that we now call central banks emerged in the 17
th 
and 18
th centuries when governments needed banks to help finance wars and developed 
particularly strong relationships with banks that served as the government fiscal agent. 
Although no one today would suggest that deficit financing is a proper role for a modern 
central bank, it was their original function.   
 
  Modern notions of central banking date to the 19
th century and were most clearly 
articulated by Walter Bagehot, the founder of The Economist.  To Bagehot the unique 
role of the central bank is to be available to serve as the lender of last resort.  The central 
bank should lend (discount) freely when liquidity is needed.  It should lend to banks and 
anyone else (‘to the market’ in Bagehot’s words) who can present good collateral and it 
should lend at a penalty rate which provides incentives for borrowers to repay as soon as 
they are able and for banks to maintain adequate liquidity.  That is, solvent but illiquid 
institutions should have a ready source of cash.  The knowledge that the central bank 
stands there to lend freely will prevent depositor runs and forced sales of assets which 
can start a downward spiral.  It is commonly assumed that this characterization of 
                                                 
 
3 Perhaps Gordon Brown’s most triumphant moment as Chancellor of Exchequer 
was in May 1997 when he granted the Bank its independence.  He announced that the 
chancellor would no longer meet monthly with the Governor of the Band of England  to 
determine interest rate policy, saying that: "I want to set in place a long term framework 
for economic prosperity....". 
 
4 See Goodhart (2010) identifies three historical eras regarding the role of central 
banks: the real bills doctrine of the Victorian age, a mid century period of government 
control and  the market-oriented era that ended with the crisis. 
  2Bagehot’s lender of last resort guided central bankers in the 19
th and 20
th centuries.  This 
turns out not to be the case, central bankers often had other things in mind.  
 
  In the United States, the Federal Reserve System was established in wake of the 
banking panic of 1907 which was stopped when JP Morgan forced fellow NY bankers to 
play the role of the lender of last resort.  He did not have an easy time organizing an 
adequate private sector response and the experiences of 1907 were instrumental in 
bringing the Fed into existence.  However, the founders and early leaders of the 
American central bank were thinking about roles other than panic avoidance and the 
lender of last resort function.  Their emphasis was on the adequate and timely provision 
of liquidity to smooth out interbank operations. 
 
  US credit markets were subject to various disruptions that the new central bank 
sought to ameliorate.  First, in the fall of every year, European buyers of US agricultural 
exports would borrow dollars to finance their purchases leading to spikes in interest rates 
and gold flows. The role of the Fed was to provide the liquidity needed (an “elastic 
currency” in the language of Federal Reserve act) to smooth out the seasonal funding 
shortfalls associated with agricultural cycles.  Second, the Fed shared a commitment with 
other major economies that the Gold Standard with exchange rates fixed to gold should 
be maintained.  This commitment determined its interest rate policies as well as its 
attitudes towards price changes in the post World War I era.  Stabilizing credit markets 
and supporting the gold standard turned out to be the Fed’s primary interests.  It provided 
liquidity when needed and was careful not to provide too much.  The Fed’s credit 
creation was guided by the “real bills” doctrine which said that a central bank should 
provide support for lending related to real economic activity but that is should not 
discount bills that might support speculation.
5  Ironically, by the time the Depression 
started the Fed seemed to have forgotten both Bagehot’s dictum and Morgan’s problem.  
 
  Perhaps, due to its decentralized structure
6 or perhaps due to a lack of clear 
planning or thinking about its role, the Fed did not fulfill the Bagehot doctrine when 
banks failures spread in 1932-33.  As Friedman and Schwartz (1963) documented, the 
Fed did little to ease credit as the money supply and the price level plummeted. If 
anything, its perverse actions to defend the gold standard probably helped transmit the 
crisis abroad.  With regard to domestic banks, the post-1929 Fed remained committed to 
the real bills doctrine.   It feared that any expansion of reserves would fund speculation 
and increase risk in the banking system.   
 
                                                 
 
5 For a description of the Fed’s lending policies in its first decades see Bordo and 
Wheelock (2010), one of several interesting papers prepared for the Jekyll Island 
Conference commemorating the 100
th anniversary of the 1910 meeting at Jekyll Island, 
Georgia where the structure of the Federal Reserve System was hammered out. 
 
6 The original Fed structure consisted of weak regional banks without any strong 
core leadership.  For a time, Benjamin Strong, the first President of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York provided forceful leadership but he died in 1928.  
  3  The response to the Depression exhibited little awareness within the Fed of the 
roles of central banks as they are now widely understood.  First, Bagehot had been 
forgotten by central bankers concerned with risks of lending.  Second, the macro 




The introduction of deposit insurance effectively removed the threat of bank panics in the 
post war period and the Fed began to develop its new macroeconomic policy role.  In the 
aftermath of the Depression the new academic discipline of macroeconomics emerged.  
 
  Emergence of macro monetary policy.  Macroeconomic stabilization policy in the 
post War period started with a Keynesian emphasis that downplayed the role of monetary 
policy and emphasized the role of fiscal policy.  However, this balance changed over the 
course of time, particularly after the inflationary episodes of the 1970s.  As the Keynesian 
notion that short run changes in fiscal policy could effectively stabilize the macro 
economy receded into the background – monetary policy became more and more 
important.   
 
  In addition to the debate between Keynesian and monetarist views of the role of 
monetary policy, there were intense debates about how to conduct macro monetary 
policy. One issue was the choice between monetary aggregates (the money supply) and 
interest rates targets.  Another issue was the choice between rules and discretion in 
forming monetary policy.  It is worthy of note that throughout all of those discussions the 
preeminent role of monetary policy was taken for granted. 
  
  There were some important changes in Fed operating procedures over the course 
of the 20
th century.  In the interwar period, the Fed influenced financial markets by 
changing its discounting policies with member banks.  It changed the rate charged or the 
policies regarding paper discounted or its willingness to lend to a particular institution.  
Over time, open market operations conducted with the government securities dealers 
emerged as the primary means for influencing credit availability, reserves and interest 
rates.  In terms of the aggregate effects, the operating procedure did not matter.  
Moreover, open market operations using auction procedures were viewed as a much 
better means of influencing the credit market.  First, with open market operations, the Fed 
could interact with all market participants and not just the banks that might be borrowing.  
Second, interest rates were set in a market oriented fashion based on the outcome of 
auctions.  Third, open market operations could be easily used to alter the volume and 
frequency of interventions to meet policy needs and maintain financial market stability.
8 
These changes in operating procedures had the effect of pushing the Fed’s relationships 
with its customers, the banks who might be borrowers, into the background. 
                                                 
 
7 That is not entirely correct – Henry Thornton had articulated much of what we 
call monetary economics in the early 19
th century – but no one gives him much heed. 
 
8 The IMF advised emerging market countries to develop government securities 
markets so that open market operations could be used to conduct monetary policies and 
the number of countries doing so increased dramatically. 
  4 
Although the intermediate targets and operating procedures varied from the 1970s 
to the 1990s, it was clear that the central focus of central banking was on macro 
economic stabilization.   By the 1990s – economic policy in the US was monetary policy.   
And the policy was conducted by choosing  the appropriate target for short term interest 
rates, specifically the inter bank borrowing rate – the Fed funds rate and conducting open 
market operations to maintain the target rate.  And no one was better at choosing the 
appropriate target rate than Alan Greenspan who guided the Federal Reserve for 19 
years.
9  As the 20
th century drew to a close, students of central banking and monetary 
policy thought that they had it all figured out. 
 
  Federal Reserve’s approach to policy. In the Greenspan-Bernanke era the narrow 
focus on macroeconomic monetary policy led to policy culture that overlooked some 
important developments that ran up to the crisis. 
 
To begin, start with the monetary policy targets used by the Fed.  In the 1990s, 
inflation targeting swept through the central bank world but was resisted by the Fed.  
Vocal proponents of inflation targeting included Fredric Mishkin who served on the 
Federal Reserve Board from 2006-08.  Greenspan eschewed formal inflation targets in 
favor of a discretionary approach to policy decisions.  Nevertheless, the Fed’s policy 
reports began to give increasing prominence to its inflation forecast and once it began 
publishing longer term inflation forecasts, these numbers were widely viewed as its 
inflation target.   
 
There was a debate starting in the late 1990s concerning whether asset price 
inflation and bubbles should be a concern of monetary policy (see Wadwhani (2008)).  
The issue is whether monetary policy should respond to sharp rises in asset prices and 
take action to prevent the growth (and the burst) of bubbles. Greenspan and Bernanke 
both argued against any role for asset prices in policy setting.  In regard to bubbles, 
Greenspan (1999) told Congress that policy should “mitigate the fallout when it occurs.”  
This has led famously to the notion that the role of the central bank is to mop up after the 
bubble bursts.  Similarly, Bernanke (2002) said “’leaning against the bubble’ is unlikely 
to be productive in practice.”  Other central bankers seemed to agree that the policy 
tightening needed to prick a bubble would have to be large enough to push an economy 
into recession.  The danger of false positives – tightening when there really was not a 
bubble – was viewed as too great to warrant any concern ex ante about bubbles.  
 
 In retrospect the debate had important implications that were not adequately 
appreciated.  Monetary policy analysis broadly concerned with asset markets would have 
been paying closer attention to the role of financial institutions and the amounts of 
leverage.   The policy discussions often took too simple a view by asking whether asset 
                                                 
9 The monetarist emphasis on the growth of credit and money aggregates receded 
from view because financial sector innovation made velocity for the standard aggregates 
less and less predictable.  
 
  5prices should be a macroeconomic target.  The emphasis on bubbles in asset prices was 
misplaced because policy makers seemed to argue that asset prices only mattered when a 
bubble occurred. Bubbles are only identifiable as such when they burst.  To my 
knowledge, no one articulated the view that policymakers should watch and evaluate 
asset price movements and their implications for financial stability before a bubble bursts 
or is even expected.  The aim of policy should be to prevent bubbles rather than to just 
respond to them.  The consensus view among central bankers was that monetary policy 
should target inflation (the price of produced goods and services) and not be concerned 
with the prices of assets (housing and equities).  . 
 
Central bankers chose not to target bubbles.  As a consequence, little attention 
was paid to the implications of asset prices for financial stability.  Thus, policy makers 
paid little attention to significant developments such as increased lending, increasing 
leverage ratios and weakening financial institutions that are often associated with 
increasing asset prices.  By choosing to ignore asset price inflation, the Fed chose to 
ignore these other developments as well.  
 
The narrow view of macro targets weakened any connection between monetary 
policy making and the overall or systemic health of financial institutions.  Similarly, the 
focus on open market operations as the sole tool of policy reduced the importance and 
emphasis on the Fed’s connection to individual financial institutions. Moreover, with 
increasing liquidity of the fed funds and government securities markets, banks had less 
need to utilize the central bank lending facility.  The typical volume of borrowing 
through the discount window dropped to miniscule levels.  The Federal Reserve and the 
banking system were less intimately connected which made the whole idea of the lender 
of last resort atrophy. 
 
  There were some exceptional episodes late in the 20
th century where the lender of 
last resort facility showed signs of life.  Discount lending was invaluable in a handful of 
emergency situations such as the Bank of New York computer failure in 1985 that halted 
clearing in the government securities market, the aftermath of the 1987 market crash, and 
in the days following 9/11. Y2K disruptions were widely anticipated and the Fed took 
concerted action to encourage use of its lending facilities although those fears never 
materialized.  In fact, the Fed was concerned that its borrowing facilities were so 
infrequently used that they would not be available when such emergences arose.  It 
introduced some procedural changes, to little effect, to encourage banks to make greater 
use of discount lending which was often less than $100 million in total. 
 
  Although macro monetary policy was the dominant concern, and surely the public 
face, of the Fed, it, like many other central banks, continued to have supervisory 
responsibilities as well.  First, the Fed always had a role in the supervision of national 
banks (a task that it shared with other regulators) and legislative changes regarding bank 
holding companies extended the Fed role.  Second, it had responsibility for the integrity, 
efficiency, and accessibility of the payments and settlement systems.   
 
  6  The biggest pre-crisis bank failure in the United States was Continental Illinois 
which was taken over by the deposit insurer (FDIC) in 1984.  The Fed stood ready to lend 
in order to avoid any contagion effects but the fall out from the failure was less than 
feared.  However, that experience and the failure of the Bank of New England in 1991 
brought to light a problem which further diminished the lender of last resort role.  That is, 
discount lending to a weak institution provided the non-insured depositors with the 
opportunity to leave.   Ultimately, a smaller institution with just bad assets and insured 
deposits became the insurer’s responsibility.  These experiences showed the difficulty in 
distinguishing between solvency and liquidity problems in modern banks.  However, it 
was not viewed as a matter of concern since panics and runs were assumed to be a thing 
of the past,  
 
  In summary, we have shown that at the end of the 20
th century central banking in 
the US and elsewhere had two distinguishing features. First, macro policy was clearly the 
primary role of the central bank.   Second, deposit insurance made bank runs and panics 
an historical curiosity.  The lender of last resort articulated by Bagehot seemed obsolete. 
At this time, the wave of consolidations in American banking had barely started, the 
industry was still largely regional which made any thought about systemic failure largely 
irrelevant. At the end of the 20
th century monetary policy and banking policy seemed 
disconnected.
10  Lending through the discount window was viewed as an emergency 
facility for individual banks and seemed unconnected to stabilization policy or financial 
stability.   
 
  Although it was understood that the lender of last resort function was there to 
make sure that systemic risks did not arise, there was very little concern about such 
problems.  There was one exception, an episode where concern for systemic risks drove 
policymaking.  The private sector bailout of LTCM, a large US hedge fund that suffered 
losses in the 1998 Russian crisis, was initiated by the Federal Reserve because of concern 
about systemic implications of its failure. That episode was quickly forgotten as 
generations of financial sector stability resulted in little concern about contagion and 
systemic risks.  
 
  As we move into the 2000s, policy makers were aware of some of the pressures 
building in the financial system.  First, Ned Gramlich a member of the Federal Reserve 
Board from 1997-2005 warned repeatedly about mortgage market problems and 
published a book Subprime Mortgages: America’s Latest Boom and Bust in 2007.  
Second, Greenspan began talking about the “froth” in housing markets.
11  But, the overall 
view was that housing issues were either local or sectoral or outside the purview of 
macroeconomic policy.  The Fed had no direct responsibility for regulating the 
                                                 
 
10 The UK took this very seriously and in 1997 established the Financial Services 
Authority that removed all bank supervisory functions from the Bank of England, a move 
that is now widely regretted and slated to be at least partially reversed.  
 
11 In his June 9, 2005 testimony to the Joint Economic Committee of Congress, 
Greenspan said that “The apparent froth in housing markets may have spilled over into 
mortgage markets.” 
  7Government supported mortgage entities (i.e. Fannie and Freddie) although there were 
probably ample indirect ways in which policy makers could have sounded alarm bells. 
 
  As the 20
th century came to a close, there were structural changes underway in the 
financial sector that had much greater implications than was knows as they occurred.
12  
First, regulatory changes in the US enabled the banks to extend the scope of their 
activities.  It is only in this period that the American banking sector became so 
concentrated and a handful of nation wide banks emerged as the dominant forces in the 
industry.  Second, technology and regulatory changes came together to enable the 
development of the shadow banking system.  Highly leveraged non-bank institutions with 
short term liabilities and illiquid longer term assets grew very rapidly.  
 
We have shown that the Federal Reserve, and central banks generally, have 
chosen different roles at different times.  Even the role of the lender of last resort was 
viewed very differently over the years and the understanding of that role colored policy 
decisions.  In fact, you might say that since Bagehot published Lombard Street in 1873, 
central banks never fully developed or defined their lending role particularly in regard to 
systemic crises.  If Bagehot’s view had prevailed, the Federal Reserve during the 
depression might have been less concerned with the risk of lending and would have been 
willing to lend aggressively whenever collateral was available.   In contemporary times, 
the emphasis on macro economic policy goals pushed the lender of last resort function to 
the margins and left the Fed poorly largely unprepared for the financial crisis.  Although 
the Fed does not seem to have any contingency plans waiting, it did move quickly in 
response to the financial crisis of 2008.  In fact, it very quickly developed extensive new 
lending roles, another chapter in the ever-changing role of central banks. 
 
Federal Reserve lending.   The regular lending activities of the Federal Reserve 
System became less significant in the late 20
th century as the threat of banking panics 
retreated once deposit insurance was introduced and as other means to obtain liquidity 
developed.  Some economists suggested that the lender of last resort role for central 
banks is obsolete. In the modern world, well developed financial markets with liquid 
securities markets and an active interbank market, there should be no such thing as an 
illiquid but solvent firm and no need for central bank lending functions.  Solvent firms 
should always be able to arrange financing on the interbank market or the repo market.   
 
Anna Schwartz (1992) examined the history of discount lending by the Federal 
Reserve and concluded that it had moved irreparably away from Bagehot’s conception.  
She argued that the distinction between lending to provide liquidity and lending to prop 
up insolvent institutions had become unclear although the Fed never acknowledged as 
much. Further, she was concerned (perhaps with prescience) with the use of central bank 
lending to provide capital loans to non-banks.  Her recommendation was that the Fed’s 
discount window be abolished.  She argued that any systemic liquidity needs could 
                                                 
12 Ross Levine (2010) chronicles the regulatory decisions and the structural 
changes that emerged in the fifteen years before the crisis and contributed to it. 
  8always be satisfied with open market operations.  The need for targeted lending responses 
when failing institutions can create a systemic problem was simply not entertained. 
 
The window was not closed down but, as noted earlier, the Fed’s discount lending 
virtually disappeared in the late 20
th century.   However, central bank lending came back 
with vengeance in 2008. The Fed utilized emergency lending powers that were hardly 
known and little understood because they had not been used after the 1930s.  
 
The Fed had extensive lending powers under the 1932 amendment of the Federal 
Reserve Act (section 13(3)) and revised later on (see Fettig (2002)) to lend to nonbanks 
in “unusual and exigent” circumstances.  On occasion there were suggestions that the Fed 
use these lending powers to provide funds to non-banks, such as at the time of the 
Chrysler bankruptcy in 1970, the New York City bankruptcy in 1975 and when the US 
airlines faced serious problems after 9/11.  However, the Fed resisted such suggestions 
(although there was a short loan to the FDIC bank insurance fund in 1991) until March 
2008. It reversed precedent when it arranged the sale of Bear Stearns to Morgan Chase.  
By the end of that year 2008, there were $600 billion in section 13(3) loans outstanding. 
From August to December, the Fed’s balance sheet increased by more than 2  times. 
 
Cecchetti and Disyatat (2010) show how the Federal Reserve developed its lender 
of last resort role in the course of the recent financial crisis to address a variety of 
problems.  Liquidity problems can affect clearing (central bank liquidity), individual 
financial institutions (funding liquidity) and financial markets (market liquidity).  The 
Fed quickly adapted its lending activity to cope with all three of these problems.  
Nevertheless, there was considerable public backlash against the Fed’s lending which 
was characterized as a bailout of Wall Street firms.  As a result, the Dodd-Frank financial 
reform bill passed in 2010 circumscribes the Fed’s ability to use emergency lending 
powers to assist individual institutions. 
 
  This is not the time to analyze the causes to the financial crisis or the Fed’s 
imaginative responses to the crisis, which are described by some as heroic and successful 
and by others as disastrous precedents (see Acharya and Richardson, 2009).  It is 
sufficient to say that the recent crisis reinforces the conclusion of our historical overview: 
the role of central banks has always been changing.  Thus, I will turn to the second topic 
of this essay: What is a central bank supposed to do?  Both current crisis experience and 
our review of central bank history suggest that there are no simple answers to the 
question.  In the next section, I discuss the future role of central banking and some of the 
lessons from early 21









   Central bank functions fall into three areas: monetary policy, the supervision and 
regulation of individual financial institutions, and systemic regulation of the financial 
sector as a whole.  This latter function includes both the traditional concern for the 
functioning of the payments system and a new set of concerns about system-wide (or 
macro-prudential) risk arising from the increased complexity and interconnectedness of 
financial institutions and markets.  We will argue here that the relationships among these 
three areas have been widely underappreciated.  The predominant view in the 20
th 
century was to deal with the first two functions independently and third not at all.  
Central banking in the 21
st century will have to develop ways of dealing with all three 
functions simultaneously. 
 
  Monetary policy.  Very few would argue with the idea that monetary policy aimed 
at economic stabilization should rest in the hands of an independent central bank. 
Although there are those (such as the American Congressman, Ron Paul) who advocate 
the abolition of central banks, economists have shown that independent central banks 
achieve lower and less volatile inflation rates than those that are beholden to governments 
in power, and that they do so at no long-run cost to economic output.  
 
In the United States, the Fed has a dual mandate to maintain stable prices and full 
employment. Many other central banks -- the ECB is a notable example – have price 
stability as their primary mandate.  A central bank uses its policy tools to influence 
interest rates and the growth of money and credit in order to attain its specified goals. An 
independent central bank can pursue these goals without concern for an election cycle 
that might tempt elected policy makers to pursue short-term goals such as unsustainably 
high employment and real growth with little concern for longer-run inflationary 
implications.   
 
  Some argue that the function of a central bank should begin and end with the 
macro objectives of monetary policy, and that any other obligation would distract the 
central bank from achieving its primary goal of economic stabilization (or specifically, 
price stability). 
 
  However, this approach ignores important links between monetary policymaking, 
financial regulation, and prudential supervision that favor a wider role for a modern 
central bank.  In addition to its macroeconomic effects, monetary policy can affect the 
behavior of financial institutions and may create weaknesses in the financial system.  
 
The obvious example of this is the monetary policy pursued by the Fed in the 
early 2000s.  The Fed began reducing its target for the funds rate even before the 
economy started contracting and it fell rapidly from 6% to 1.75% over the course of 
                                                 
13 This section draws on chapter 2 (“The Power of Central Banks and the Future 
of the the Federal Reserve System” by T. Cooley, K. Schoenholtz, G.D. Smith, R. Sylla 
and P. Wachtel) in Acharya et. al. (2010).  
  102001.  Although the expansion began in November 2001, the funds rate target was 
reduced again at the end of 2002 and in mid 2003.  It reached a record (at that time) low 
of 1% in June 2003 and was held that level for 12 months.   Thus, the first increase in the 
funds rate target occurred 29 months after the end of the recession.  By one measure the 
real Fed funds rate was negative for 5  years.
14 
 
It is interesting to read the Federal Reserve Board’s (2003) own description of its 
thought processes and considerations around the time that the funds rate target reached its 
lowest value: 
To provide more specific guidance about its views, the FOMC included in its 
[May 2003] announcement separate assessments of the risks to the outlook for 
economic growth and inflation…. The Committee viewed the upside and 
downside risks to economic growth as balanced, but it perceived a higher 
probability of an unwelcome substantial fall in inflation than of a pickup in 
inflation from its current low level. That said, members concluded that there was 
only a remote possibility that resource utilization would remain so low that the 
disinflation process would cumulate to produce a declining overall price level for 
an extended period.  
[At the June meeting] [w]ith inflation already low and inflation expectations 
subdued, the Committee judged that it would be prudent to add further support for 
economic expansion, and it lowered the target for the federal funds rate 25 basis 
points, to 1 percent. The FOMC continued to view the risks to economic growth 
as balanced and again noted that the minor probability of substantial further 
disinflation exceeded the probability of a pickup in inflation from its current low 
level. But because of the considerable amount of economic slack prevailing and 
the economy’s ability to expand without putting upward pressure on prices, the 
Committee indicated that the small chance of an unwelcome substantial decline in 
the inflation rate was likely to remain its predominant concern for the foreseeable 
future.   
 
The Fed funds rate was kept very low for a very long period because of concerns 
about deflation and weakness of a recovery that was almost two years old.  The report 
does indicate an awareness of issues that became more important in later years – 
mortgage refinancing, accounting practices at the GSEs and ‘buoyant’ growth of M2. 
Policy seems to carefully weight the upside and downside risks regarding both macro 
goals but (easily said in retrospect) seems blithely unaware of any longer term 
implications for behavior in credit markets or by financial institutions.   
 
A particular macro policy, like that in 2003, is not necessarily going to imply that 
systemic problems will arise but the emphasis on macro meant that no one within the Fed 
or elsewhere was even asking whether macro monetary policy might have such systemic 
consequences.  Experience in the intervening years has surely shown that 21
st century 
                                                 
14 The monthly average effective fund rates less the percentage change from a 
year ago in the seasonally adjusted CPI-U was negative from April 2001 until September 
2006. 
  11central banking should avoid this disconnect between macro monetary policy and its 
other functions. 
 
  Supervision and regulation.  It is important to remember that central banks started 
as banks with important lending activities, both on a regular basis and as the lender of last 
resort.  The monetary policy function of central banks grew out of their lending activities 
as early central banks discovered that their lending influenced credit availability, interest 
rates and gold flows even before macroeconomic policy became an acknowledged role.  
As a regular lender to the financial system and sometimes lender of last resort when 
special liquidity problems threatened the operation of the banking system, the central 
bank had a clear interest in knowing the viability of its customers. It is only logical that 
such a lender should have sufficient information about borrowers to be able to make 
sound loans. Thus, it is no accident that the lender of last resort also played a role with 
bank regulatory and supervisory functions.  However, the supervisory function of the 
central bank is only significant if it maintains an active lending role.
15    As we saw 
earlier, late 20
th century observers were mistaken to write off central bank lending.  Its 
role expanded significantly in the crisis. However, as long as the lender of last resort 
continues to be an important central banking role, it is crucial that the lender be able to 
obtain timely information about any potential borrower. This is a key ground of the 
argument that the central bank should have a role in bank supervision and regulation.  
The central bank needs to know its customers.  
 
Conceivably, the supervision and regulation of individual banking institutions 
need not be a central bank function. In some countries, it is housed in other government 
agencies.  We already noted that in the United Kingdom all bank supervision was moved 
from the Bank of England to the FSA.  The ECB has no direct role in bank supervision, 
which is done at the national level.  And in the United States the Fed has always shared 
these functions with state and national agencies responsible for chartering banks, as well 
as with the deposit insurance agency 
 
  One might argue that the real issue is effective communication between the 
central bank and any other agencies with supervisory authority. In practice, however, 
instances where the role of supervisor and lender of last resort have been separated – such 
as in the United Kingdom, where the Bank of England acts as lender of last resort and the 
Financial Supervisory Authority oversees the potential borrowers – have highlighted how 
difficult it is to communicate effectively in a crisis.  As a result, the Conservative Party in 
the UK has proposed eliminating the Financial Supervisory Authority and returning bank 
supervision to the Bank of England. 
 
  The benefits of linking the lender of last resort and the role of supervision go 
beyond the advantages of rapid communication. The skills and expertise developed in the 
                                                 
15 Of course it is also common for legislation to explicitly make the central bank 
the agency responsible for bank regulation and examination.  The Federal Reserve has 
primary regulatory responsibility for bank holding companies and state chartered 
members of the Federal Reserve System. 
  12course of regulation and supervision may help the lender of last resort to innovate when 
necessary in a liquidity crisis. For example, the rapid introduction of new Fed lending 
facilities during the crisis under conditions of extreme stress would have been difficult in 
the absence of extensive hands-on experience in the financial system on the part of Fed. 
Similarly, experience in regulation and supervision may be critical for the development 
of effective systemic risk regulation, which we will discuss below.  
 
  Thus, the thrust of our argument is that the central bank should have a role in the 
supervision, regulation and examination of financial institutions so that it is well 
informed about its potential borrowers.  Further, the knowledge gathered in the regulatory 
process leaves the lender of last resort prepared to respond when crises emerge.  We have 
not discussed here the parameters of supervision that keep the regulator well informed.  
Perhaps most important is the regular examination of banks and the setting of accounting 
and valuation standards.  In addition, the determination and enforcement of capital 
adequacy and liquidity standards is essential to prevent individual institutions from 
becoming insolvent. 
 
  The scope of bank regulatory activities is well known.  A more complex issue is 
determining which types of organizations should be supervised. The lender of last resort 
role probably is of greatest relevance in dealing with institutions whose instability would 
pose a direct threat to the financial system as a whole. The experience of the recent crisis 
suggests that large, complex financial institutions (LCFIs) are more likely to be sources 
of systemic disruption. For this reason, there would appear to be a stronger case for 
linking the lender of last resort to the supervision of LCFIs than to the supervision of 
other financial institutions. 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible for a wide array of small financial institutions to pose 
such a systemic threat if they face a common exposure that makes them collectively 
vulnerable. In the US, the thrift crisis of the early 1980s is the usual example although it 
really did not present the truly systemic risks that we faced in 2008-09.  The best known 
problems in the recent crisis were the LCFIs such as Lehman and AIG.  However, the 
most dangerous aspects of the crisis were the meltdown of the commercial paper market 
and the run on money market funds, both examples where common shocks to many small 
entities had systemic implications. 
 
The set of institutions that can present systemic risks is not restricted to banks that 
have traditionally dealt with the central bank but includes other financial institutions as 
well.  The fact the Fed had little connection to the shadow banking system was a 
contributory factor to the panic that occurred at the height of the crisis.  The legal 
authority to support lending to nonbanks was at times unclear and lack of knowledge of 
their activities made intervention to lend or support shadow banks in both the US and 
Europe uncertain. 
 
  The Federal Reserve and its district Reserve Banks are naturally reluctant to give 
up their supervisory role over any banks, including smaller ones. Bank regulation is a 
major activity for the district banks. Ensuring the soundness of banks large and small is 
  13viewed as integral to economic health of the regions they serve. Confidential information 
obtained in the course of supervising banks can be of use in evaluating monetary policy, 
especially when it helps policymakers to anticipate demand for and supply of credit. 
Nevertheless, the case for Fed supervision of smaller banks is less compelling than the 
case for supervision of large, potentially systemic financial institutions – including 
nonbanks.
16   
 
  Thus, we see that the central bank has a role to play in the regulation and 
supervision of any potential borrower.  It should be party to regulation that monitors risk 
taking so that financial institutions remain individually solvent and do not need to turn to 
the lender of last resort.  As long as we are thinking of risk taking by individual 
institutions, the central bank does not have to be principally involved in setting standards 
and conducting oversight, good communication could be adequate.  However, the 
argument for central bank involvement is compelling when we consider financial 
institutions that might be part of a systemic failure.  
 
  Systemic risk regulator.  Although systemic risk is not a new idea, the notion of 
an explicit systemic-risk regulatory function is new. Addressing systemic threats was an 
implicit function of the Fed because its lender of last resort facility was the only tool 
available tool to respond to systemic risk problems. When clearing failures, Y2K 
concerns, or the terrorist attacks of 9/11 threatened the operation of the financial system, 
the Fed’s discount window was the tool available to address the problems.   The 
availability of the discount window for emergency lending made it the central bank’s tool 
for responding to systemic risks. 
 
  It is often hard to make a clear distinction in advance between lending that might 
be needed by an individual institution and lending that might be needed to prevent 
systemic problems.  In some instances, support of a single institution (such as the Fed’s 
use of the discount window to ameliorate the effects of operational problems) can avoid 
the emergence of systemic problems.  In other instances, lending to a specific institution 
such as AIG or a set of institutions such as the commercial paper market is needed to 
maintain the functioning of the financial system.  
 
Emergency lending does take the central bank’s focus away from monetary 
control and there are still some who would argue against any other role for central banks.  
However, the recent crisis demonstrated the importance of having an institution that can 
respond quickly and broadly to systemic risks.   
 
  A tool for responding to systemic risks is not the same thing as a macro prudential 
regulator with the authority to monitor systemic risks and take regulatory actions to 
reduce them before they erupt into crisis.  The fact that the central bank has the tools to 
respond to emergencies does not mean that the central bank must also be the macro 
prudential regulator.  It is well suited to do so because of its existing connections to the 
                                                 
16 Alan Blinder (2010, p. 132) agrees that Fed supervision of small banks is less 
than compelling and “peripheral to its core mission.” 
  14financial system and, as the recent crisis highlights, it is valuable to have one authority 
unambiguously responsible for responding to systemic risks.  Interestingly, the recent 
financial reform legislation in the US (the 2010 Dodd-Frank bill) partially removes the 
Fed from that role by setting up an interagency Financial Stability Oversight Council as 
the systemic regulator. 
 
  A systemic-risk regulator should have influence that stretches out in multiple 
directions.  First, the systemic regulator needs to augment the oversight and supervision 
of institutions that are so large and interconnected that any insolvency would create 
systemic problems.   Second, it must be able to address systemic problems that can arise 
from smaller institutions facing a common vulnerability.  For example, the 2008 run on 
money market funds, none of which was individually sufficiently large or interconnected 
to present a systemic risk, threatened the financial system.  These funds, part of the so-
called shadow banking system, lacked deposit insurance and automatic access to the 
lender of last resort were vulnerable because funds can be withdrawn at face value with 
little or no notice and assets are not always liquid. 
 
Third, the systemic regulator must have authority over the shadow banking 
system including any new institutions or instruments that may create new systemic risks. 
An important contributor to the crisis was shadow bank institutions – such as broker-
dealers – that are dependent on the collateralized repo market.
17 The systemic regulator 
should have the authority to regulate such risk-laden market funding practices, in addition 
to the behavior of any institution that can generate systemic risks.     
 
Fourth, economic conditions can give rise to systemically risky activity.  Rapid 
credit expansion, the deterioration of credit standards and asset price bubbles are all 
macro problems that can give rise to systemic weaknesses.  For example, the extended 
period of low interest rates in the early 2000s promoted rapid credit expansion and some 
of the excesses, particularly in the mortgage markets, that generated the crisis.  Thus the 
phrase macro-prudential regulation arose to reflect the post crisis realization that 
monetary policy needs to stay cognizant of the systemic stability implications of policy.  
 
For these reasons, systemic risk and the regulation, supervision and oversight of 
individual financial institutions are closely linked.  The monitoring of each financial 
institution individually is not sufficient for avoiding systemic problems.  Thus, the 
systemic risk regulator should be a powerful entity. It should have explicit regulatory 
authority over systemically important institutions (the LCFIs). In addition, it should be 
able to rein in the systemically risky activities of any financial institution – shadow 
banks, hedge funds, insurance companies, for example -- including ones that are not 
otherwise subject to regulatory oversight. If the behavior of any financial institution 
creates systemic threats, the regulator has reason to be concerned.  
 
                                                 
17  For an explanation of how the shadow banking system engaged in banking see 
Gorton (2010). 
  15There are two distinct aspects of macro prudential regulation.  First is the one 
given the most attention in the recent crisis, crisis management or the ability to respond in 
a timely and comprehensive manner to systemic problems.  The Federal Reserve’s use of 
section 13(3) lending authority and other innovations in the recent crisis are examples 
and there has been much discussion of whether these crisis response tools should be 
expanded or circumscribed because they were abused.  As long as the central bank has 
the authority to lend in emergency situations, it should, as we argued above, have a role 
in the regulation of institutions that might present systemic risks.  The second and more 
challenging aspect of macro prudential regulation is how to set systemic risk standards 
for the financial sector as a whole, macroprudential policy.  Little is known about the 
tools for measuring systemic risks and the instruments to regulate it.  
 
Central banks do not have a clear idea yet of what are appropriate measures of 
systemic risk or what they should be targeting in order to conduct macroprudential risk 
management.  The modestly named BIS Committee on the Global Financial System 
(CGFS) is addressing the issue.  In a recent paper (CGFS, 2010) it acknowledges that its 
definition of systemic risk is vague because of “its dependence on time- and economy- 
specific circumstances” (p.2) and, further, that “In most countries, macroprudential policy 
frameworks are at an early stage of development” (p.8). Systemic risk may not be a new 
idea but systemic risk management is.  21
st century central banks need to develop the 
tools for systemic risk measurement and management that are needed for crisis 
avoidance. 
 
 Experience has taught us how, for example, to set minimum capital requirements 
for an individual institution operating in a normal environment. We can determine the 
appropriate capital stock buffers that an institution needs to maintain in order to 
withstand a negative shock.  But we have little experience in determining the buffers that 
individual institutions and the system as a whole need to maintain in the presence of a 
systemic shock or crisis.   
 
Monetary authorities in both the U.S. and Europe quickly introduced some efforts 
at prudential management in the immediate aftermath of the crisis in the form of ‘stress’ 
tests.  These tests postulate a macroeconomic shock and simulate its effect on the balance 
sheet of financial institutions in order to determine whether the banks have sufficient 
capital to cope with the hypothesized stress.  The Federal Reserve’s initial stress tests 
were conducted on the 19 largest bank holding companies in the U.S.  The results, 
announced in May 2009, had a calming effect on financial markets because the capital 
shortfalls were less than had been feared; another round of stress tests is underway.  The 
Committee of European Banking Supervisors along with other authorities conducted 
stress tests on a large number of European banks in both 2009 and 2010.  
 
These stress tests are based on macroeconomic scenarios but are in the end 
examinations of individual banks rather than tests for systemic weakness.  The 
appropriate systemic risk standards for both capital held by each bank and the aggregate 
amount of capital in the banking system (and hence overall leverage levels in the 
financial industry) are yet to be developed.  Vice Chair of the Board of Governors Janet 
  16Yellin (2010) acknowledges that many of the tools of macroprudential supervision are the 
same as those traditionally used for microprudential supervision.  The standards to be 
used to measure systemic risks are missing and the responses to be used in the presence 
of systemic risks need to be defined.  Yellin (2010, p.3) further argues that “Monetary 
policy cannot be a primary instrument for systemic risk management.”  That is, a 
monetary tightening would not have been the only appropriate response to the developing 
systemic risks in the U.S. in the years before the crisis.  There are a few suggestions of 
what the appropriate tools might be, such as countercyclical capital requirements and 
contingent capital arrangements.  However, much more needs to be done to develop both 
the means of measuring the presence of systemic risks and to put in place the tools to 
respond to it. 
 
  Thus, monetary policy, regulation of financial institutions and macro prudential 
regulation are tightly linked together.  As a result an argument can be made for giving the 
central bank a role in all three.   Even if we view macro policy to be the primary function 
of the central bank, it needs to monitor financial institutions because no macro policy can 
succeed without financial stability.  And since economic stability goals cannot be attained 
without a modicum of financial stability, the macro economic and macro prudential roles 
are tied together.  The micro regulatory role is tied in as well since large complex 
institutions as well as panics among smaller institutions can have systemic implications.   
 
  These broad roles for the 21
st century central bank do not come without risks.  
The emergency responses to crisis, such as those put in place in 2008-09, may cross the 
line into fiscal policy and involve political judgments which might compromise the 
independence of the central bank and its ability to pursue its primary role, 
macroeconomic monetary policy. Goodfriend (2010) warns that central bank bailouts are 
politically contentious fiscal decisions that would destroy its independence. The Fed 
never stepped over this line before and the 2010 Dodd-Frank bill will result in power 
sharing with other regulators and the Treasury.  Broad oversight of the financial system 






  As the 20
th century drew to a close there seemed to be a consensus view of central 
banking.  A central bank was a politically independent entity that was responsible for 
monetary control.  Other functions were peripheral at best.  For example discount lending 
was a useful emergency facility but really just a remnant of the central bank’s historical 
banking functions. Bank supervisory activities were also peripheral and could just as 
soon be located elsewhere.  The crisis of 2007-09 changed these views forever by 
bringing the prudential and regulatory roles of central banks to the forefront and showing 
the interdependence of the roles.   
 
  I have made, I hope, a reasonably compelling case for a central bank with broad 
interrelated functions.  First, central bank should be able to conduct monetary policy 
  17without political interference.  Second, it should serve as the lender of last resort to 
provide liquidity in emergency situations and third, it should have a role in monitoring 
systemic risks and responding when they might emerge.  That is a rather large remit for 
one government agency.  But it is inevitable due to the connections among these 
functions.   
  
  As a result, central banks central banking is pulled into the realm of politics as the 
border between monetary policy and fiscal policy becomes blurred.  Consider the 
following.  In 2008, the Federal Reserve sold billions of dollars of government securities 
from its portfolio and used the funds to finance some new corporations – the Maiden 
Lane corporations (the New York Fed is located on Maiden Lane) which bought assets 
from Bear Stearns, AIG etc. - and to create new funding facilities such as those used to 
support the commercial paper market.  Is this a proper role for the central bank or has it 
crossed the line into the realm of fiscal policy, the legislation and appropriation of funds?  
If Congress wants to buy a bank or nationalize a corporation or bail out GM or funnel 
funds to the commercial paper market, it has the right to do so.  It passes legislation and 
appropriates funds.  The government would have to fund such expenditures and, as you 
can imagine, it would do so by selling bonds – a fiscal activity.  Indeed, buying GM was 
a fiscal activity by the US government.   But, that is exactly what the Fed did when it 
‘bailed out’ Wall Street.  Has the central bank, in the name of the lender of last resort to 
the financial sector and the scepter of systemic risk, usurped the role of Congress and the 
President to conduct fiscal policy – decide how much the government will spend, what it 
will be spent on and how expenditures should be financed?  These are hard questions to 
answer.  They deserve more attention from economist and politicians.   
 
  The crisis of 2007-09 suggests that a broad the role of the central bank that 
encompasses macro policy, supervision and regulation of banks and systemic risk (or 
macroprudential) oversight is warranted.  Although everyone agrees that monetary policy 
is a central bank concern, there are wide differences of opinion regarding the extent to 
which it should also have responsibility for the supervision and regulation of individual 
financial institutions and for systemic regulation of the financial sector as a whole.  
Further, there is wide disagreement regarding the border between appropriate central 
bank crisis responses and fiscal actions.  
 
The complexities of these issues does not obviate my contention that strong 
linkages among the three functions of a central bank are sufficiently compelling to 
warrant giving the central bank broad authority in all three of them.  As a consequence, 
central banks may be more political institutions than before.
18  Policy makers were aware 
that their innovative responses to the crisis increased the political involvement of the 
central bank.  At the height of the crisis, in March 2009, the Fed and the Treasury issued 
a statement outlining their respective roles and the distinction among them.  Goodfriend 
                                                 
 
18  Meltzer (2010) argues that the Fed has always been subject to political 
influence.  The idea of an independent insulated central bank was to some extent a 
caricature favored by advocates of mechanical monetary policy rules. 
 
  18(2010) suggests that a new ‘accord’ is necessary to formally define the boundaries of 
Federal Reserve credit or lending policies.   
 
  It is fascinating how little attention has been addressed to these issues in the past.  
It just did not seem to warrant the bother.  But, the questions will linger for a long time – 
the role of central banks warrants a lot more attention.  For sure, the late 20
th century 
ideal view of central banks is gone forever.  The notion of an independent agency with 
the remit of monetary control is much too limited to be realistic.  Inevitably, the central 
bank has other functions which drag it back into the political arena.  Exactly how the 21
st 
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